All
in the Family
The top cited paper in the Strategic Management
Journal in the last two years is “Risk
abatement as a strategy for R&D investments in family firms”
by Pankaj C. Patel & James J. Chrisman.
It has already been cited 13 times, according to ISI, and thus ranks as
a “highly cited paper”.
That said, my first response to it was “oh boy, here
we go again”. The theory, though crisply
stated, appears almost impossible to identify.
From the abstract:
“The behavioral agency
model suggests family firms invest less in R&D than nonfamily firms to
protect their socioemotional wealth. Studies support this contention but do not
explain how family firms make R&D investments. We hypothesize that when
performance exceeds aspirations, family firms manage socioemotional and
economic objectives by making exploitative R&D investments that lead to
more reliable and less risky sales levels. However, performance below
aspirations leads to exploratory R&D investments that result in potentially
higher but less reliable sales levels. Using a risk abatement model, our
analyses of 847 firms over 10 years supports our hypotheses.”
Yikes, I thought, we have at least two endogenous
variables: family ownership and R&D investment. How are the authors going to solve this
problem? I clicked Ctrl Find
“endogenous”. No response. Uh oh.
The needle on my bullshit-a-meter flipped into the red danger zone. But I shouldered on, before turning to the
issue (see below).
From my own work on aspirations and behavior, I knew
that endogeneity was just one of the vexing problems the authors would face in
their analysis. Another one related to
separating out changes in the mean from shifts in the variance. In other words, actions can be taken to
effect returns or actions can be taken to reduce variance. How did Patel and Chrisman solve this problem?
This
time, I was most pleasantly surprised. The authors mastered and adapted a method
from agricultural economics which improves on previous approaches used in
strategic management. It makes sense
that such an approach would come from ag-econ, because as the authors say, in
agriculture “certain inputs such as
land, labor and capital affect the mean yield, whereas other inputs such as
pesticides lower downside variability but do not necessarily increase the mean
levels or upside variability of crop yield.”
Patel and Chrisman use this approach to try to separate out how family
firms use R&D.
The approach uses two simultaneous equations. Here is how Patel and Chrisman describe the
method:
They
then interpret the coefficient estimates for B’ to test their hypotheses. Interpreting the interaction between R&D
and family ownership in a split sample (above or below aspiration) analysis,
they conclude that when
“performance is
at or above historic aspiration levels,
family firms' R&D investments are
more likely to reduce risk by decreasing
the variance of sales than those of non- family firms. In support of H2, we
find that when performance is below
aspirations the risk-reducing properties
of a family firm's R&D investments
are lower than those of nonfamily firms since the interaction of the family firm and R&D
variables is positive.
A primary motivation of this study was to debunk
several assumptions about family firms that seem to have emerged in the
literature. One of these is that family firms value non-economic goals more
highly than economic goals. Another is that in response to these differences,
family firms simply invest less in R&D than non-family firms. We recognized
that if these assumptions were true, the family form of organization would be
rare, particularly among larger firms, because just investing less in R&D would
lead, over time, to underperformance and their eventual decline as an
organizational form. Thus, we theorized that these assumptions were not
strictly true in that (1) family firms do not necessarily value non-economic
goals more than economic goals but instead simply value non-economic goals more
than non-family firms, and as a consequence (2) use their R&D investments
to pursue strategies that are different than non-family firms to achieve a
possibly expanded, but certainly different, goal set. We were also influenced
by observations in the literature using the resource-based view (e.g., Sirmon
& Hitt, 2003) that family firms are likely to possess unique configurations
of resources that support unique strategies. In other words, while usually invest
less, they make those investments strategically.
We therefore theorized two things that diverged from
the extant literature: (1) family firms seek to achieve a balanced and not
necessarily inconsistent set of economic and non-economic goals, and (2) they
do so by following different strategies that are consistent with their
idiosyncratic resource configurations. Based on these ideas, we expected to
find that family firms, more so than non-family firms, would implement R&D
strategies that yielded a more reliable and less risky level of growth than
non-family firms. As we explain in the paper, this is jointly a function of
their desire to protect their socioemotional wealth (by preserving firm control
and reputation), their undiversified financial wealth embedded in the firm, and
their distinctive resources. Recognizing that owing to their greater ability,
through control, to pursue and therefore changes strategies as it suits family
owners, we also expected to find that family firms are more likely to increase
the aggressiveness of their (R&D) strategies when the family’s socioemotional
and financial wealth are threatened. As was shown, our expectations proved
correct. We take this to mean that within their bounds of experience and
knowledge, family firms do not behave irrationally. Thus, in addition to
allowing for the substantial variations that occur among family firms (Chrisman
& Patel, 2012), future research needs to more fully consider the entire
range of goals, strategies, and resources that distinguish firms governed by family
rather than non-family owners and managers.
Chrisman, J.J., & Patel, P. (2012). Variations
in R&D investments of family and non-family firms: Behavioral agency and
myopic loss aversion perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 55, 976-997.
Sirmon, D.G., & Hitt, M.A. (2003). Managing
resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation in family
firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27, 339-358.
That’s it for the
top cite SMJ paper. Next up the top paper
in ASQ.
Your faithful
reporter. Eeyore.
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